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Double Jeopardy and the Chameleon Art in 
James Hogg's Justified Sinner 
Critics of James Hogg's Private Memoirs and Confessions 
of a Justified Sinner have often cited Coleman Parson's 
observation that, for Hogg, the supernatural is "a corridor 
leading to the ultimate strangeness, that the individual is 
both tempter and tempted."l The (critical) temptation which 
follows is that of treating Gil-Martin as Robert Wringhim's 
psychological double, and the text as a tension between 
supernatural and psychological explanations for the action. 
Such a reading is not implausible. But locating Justified 
Sinner within a Romantic/psychological doppelganger tradition 
is finally too easy--and to say that the story teeters on the 
edge of fantasy is to miss much of its suggestiveness. As 
Robert Kiely notes, "[Wringhim's] damnation and his 
intercourse with a diabolical double are not metaphors for 
his madness, they are its complements. To address oneself to 
the psychological aspects of Robert's Memoir is not a way of 
solving the mystery but a way of describing one of its 
manifestations."2 The double--whether demon or projection--
is finally an emblem, symptomatic of a more general (and 
disturbing) duplicity: his "chameleon art" raises fundamental 
questions about the problem of evil, the untruth of 
experience, and the central "Lie" of doctrine.s Gil-Martin 
is a door opening onto that strange corridor--in the end, 
perhaps, a revolving door. But the end of the corridor is 
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not in sight. As Kiely concludes, "the disturbing Question 
remains: is Robert's version of things an appalling 
deviation from nature, or is it a reflection of an even more 
appalling, because general, truth?,,4 
Proponents for the psychoanalytic reading have included 
Andre Gide, who posits that the power which sets Gil-Martin 
in action "is always of a psychological nature .... Hence 
the profound teaching of this strange book, the fantastic 
part of which (except in the last pages) is always 
psychologically explicable, without having recourse to the 
supernatural.,,5 He likens Hogg's accomplishment in this 
respect to Henry James's Turn of the Screw. Elsewhere Gide 
declares that Robert "is not mad," but "possessed." It 
amounts to the same thing; and Gide's final verdict on The 
Turn of the Screw leaves little doubt as to which 
interpretation he prefers for Justified Sinner: 
... the whole portion of the tale in which the sense 
seems to incline towards a supernatural interpretation 
is, in reality, only the natural effect of the 
governess's derangement. 
Indeed, Gide's only criticism of Justified Sinner is that, 
"regrettably," its last pages lapse into events "less 
naturally explicable."6 
Similarly, Edith Birkhead calls Justified Sinner the 
"account of a man afflicted with religious mania"; Masao 
Miyoshi observes that Wringhim "is Quite patently out of his 
mind"; and Ian Campbell, citing Robert's belief that Gil-
Martin is the Czar in disguise, wryly suggests that "no 
further comment on Robert's intelligence is necessary." "It 
seems perfectly reasonable," Barbara Bloede concludes (in a 
paper given at the James Hogg Society's first conference), 
"to try to disengage the salient facts about the onset and 
development of Robert Wringhim's madness in the light of 
modern understanding of the etiology of mental illness."7 
Pursuing the troublesome sense in which Robert may be 
"out" of his mind, David Eggenschwiller locates Gil-Martin 
firmly within a psychological doppelganger tradition: the 
"opposing halves" of Robert's psyche are "externalized into 
the religious stranger and the carnal brother," and Robert is 
"caught as a passive agent between his own flesh and his own 
spiritual devil." After killing George--the "emblem of the 
sinful, carnal self"--Robert inherits his father'S estate and 
yields to "his repressed longings ... [spending] months at 
a time in drunken, sensual debauches. Following these 
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periods he would return to his stringent, puritanical self, 
remembering nothing that had happened."s Like Edward Hyde 
(or "Mrs. Bates"), Robert's secret/predatory self slips out 
and commits crimes without his consciousness of them; like 
Henry Jekyll (or Norman), Robert must answer for these crimes 
when the authorities arrive. The "interpretive gamble" of 
the story, then, is the tension between Gil-Martin as a 
"Hyde"-like or "Mother"-like projection: i.e., a 
preternatural reality or a psychological construct.9 
Other critics have offered biographical reasons for 
Hogg's interest in doubles. Louis Simpson cites a "James 
Hog" who figured prominently in an antinomian controversy at 
or near the time of Justified Sinner's setting; perhaps, he 
suggests, Hogg felt "personally confronted with ... [this] 
antinomian spectre bearing his name, and was obliged to 
exorcise it."l0 John Carey cites Hogg's own Hunt of Eildon, 
in which a shepherd "finds himself turned into a pig (Hogg's 
nickname among the literati) and rushes about 'trying to 
escape from himself.,,·l1 Certainly Hogg was haunted by a 
kind of literary doppelganger: in 1822. members of the 
Blackwood's group created an alter-ego for him, a buffoonish 
shepherd who began appearing in that magazine's Noctes 
Ambrosianae series.12 Thus Hogg's appearance as a character 
in Justified Sinner, while no less effective, is rather less 
surprising; like Robert Wringhim, Hogg knew from experience 
what it was to "have been doing a thing and not doing it at 
the same time" (p. 160).18 
Finally, of course, the story itself is obsessed with 
doubles. It is told twice. Robert conceives himself "to be 
two people" (p. 139). George suspects from the beginning 
that he is "haunted by some evil genius in the shape of his 
brother, as well as by that dark and mysterious wretch 
himself" (p. 43). Samuel Scrape tells Robert that "the 
deB's often seen gaun sidie for sidie w'ye ... an' they 
say that he whiles takes your ain shape"; Mrs. Logan believes 
that Gil-Martin and George "are one and the same being ... 
[or] the one [is] a prototype of the other"; and Gil-Martin 
himself proclaims that "we are all subjected to two distinct 
natures in the same person" (pp. 177, 83, 174). Other 
characters are doubled: Arabella Logan and Arabella Calvert 
are particularly suspect, and extras like "William Shiel and 
W. Sword" or "Mr. L--t" and "Mr. L--w" always travel in 
pairs. There is a playful language of "doubleness" 
throughout: Robert roars "with redoubled energy," receives a 
"double" reward (or is judged "doubly guilty"), and entangles 
himself in the "double warpings" of a loom (for which "the 
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weaver's wrath [is] doubled in proportion"); his clothes are 
stolen by his double, "though under double lock and key"; and 
he objects at length that Gil-Martin's counsels, "if not 
double ... [are] amazingly crooked" (pp. 40,105,187,195-
6,198,185). "I was as one beside himself," Robert exclaims 
at one point, apparently oblivious to the "double" sense of 
his confession; there is no reason to suppose Hogg incapable 
of the pun (p. 126). 
But as Nelson Smith objects, explaining Gil-Martin as 
"the evil side of Robert's character," a "Jungian shadow," or 
the "external manifestation of Robert's guilt," is finally 
too easy: "effective as this psychological doubling is, 
there can be little doubt that Hogg does not wish to explain 
away Gil-Martin's physical reality."u "A great number of 
people now-a-days are beginning broadly to insinuate that 
there are no such things as ghosts, or spiritual beings," 
Hogg writes in "The Mysterious Bride"; "The bodies are daft." 
Simpson argues convincingly for Hogg's apparent belief in the 
supernatural; Robert's deterioration may be depicted with 
"star tingly 'modern' touches," he concludes, but Hogg "has no 
reason to pretend the Devil is unreal. We may prefer the 
Devil to be explained as an hallucination, but Hogg has no 
such preference."IS 
Preferences aside, a psychological interpretation fails 
to account adequately for Gil-Martin's function in the novel. 
It is not his "physical reality" so much as his diabolical 
capacity which is at stake. F.R. Hart makes the point 
forcefully; 
Sometimes Hogg's sinner is sure that '1 have two 
souls, which take possession of my bodily frame by 
turns,' and the Devil confirms the doctrine. But that 
is the point: the doctrine is diabolic and by no means 
the whole truth .... It is crucial to diabolic 
possession in Hogg that possession is not mere 
"doubling"--that the self is possessed by an Other, that 
the story draws partly on the primitive fear of being 
bewitched, possessed ... of being robbed of one's 
identity. 
In this way Hogg's diabolism is "significantly different from 
the repressed, sadistic sublimity of the Miltonic or 
'sensibility' Gothic." Hart goes on to argue that Hogg 
represents a distinctively Scottish Gothic, a mixture of a 
"terrible theological monomania with a grotesque folk 
diabolism" which owes as much to Hoffmann's "newly imported 
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macabre" as to the more familiar "psychologized" doubles of 
English Gothicism.I6 
Hogg's "grotesque" conflation of theology with folklore 
makes for horrific comedy. Yeats has written that folktales 
"are successions of pictures like those seen by children in 
the fire .... Everything seems possible to [country folk], 
and because they can never be surprised, they imagine the 
most surprising things.,,17 Thus when Mrs. Keeler screams 
that Robert Wringhim's friend is really his brother's spirit, 
the attorney replies, "Impossible! ... At least, I hope 
not, else his signature is not worth a pin" (p. 162). 
Linton's announcement that the Devil has "inquired" about 
Robert at the office evokes an exchange which is part comedy, 
part genuine terror: 
"Surely you are not such a fool," said [Robert], "as 
to believe that the Devil really was in the printing 
office?" 
"000, Gud bless you, sir! Saw him myself; gave him a 
nod, and good-day. Rather a gentlemanly personage--
Green Circasian hunting coat and turban--Like a 
foreigner--Has the power of vanishing in one moment 
though--Rather a suspicious circumstance that. 
Otherwise, his appearance was not much against him." (p. 
202) 
For Robert, the report has ommlOUS implications. For 
Linton, Gil-Martin's vanishing act is a detail in a set of 
equivalences--"suspicious," perhaps, but not more remarkable 
than the green hunting coat. 
Yet the collision behind such comedy is serious enough. 
The elder George warns his new wife that single-minded 
"religious devotion" is prone to caricature: 
Allowing that it is ever so beautiful, and ever so 
beneficial, were we to ride on the rigging of it at all 
times, would we not be constantly making a farce of it: 
It would be like reading the Bible and the jest-book, 
verse about, and would render the life of man a medley 
of absurdity and confusion. (p. 6) 
Robert acts on the principle, and spoils his brother's 
tennis match by repeating a player's comment--"That's a d--d 
fine blow, George!"--at every stroke, thereby "making such a 
ludicruous use of it that several of the onlookers were 
compelled to laugh . . . [and rendering] their game 
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ridiculous" (p. 22). Robert's ironic refrain is finally as 
inappropriate as Lady Dalcastle's endless devotions on her 
wedding night. "Hers were not the tenets of the great 
reformers," Hogg's fictional editor remarks, "but theirs 
mightily overstrained and deformed" (p. 4). Apparently 
deformity is the spirit of the times: thus Samuel Scrape's 
suspicion that the Devil is "often driven to the shift 0' 
preaching [the gospel] himsel, for the purpose 0' getting 
some wrang tenets introduced into it, and thereby turning it 
into blasphemy and ridicule" (p. 178). 
The "turning" of gospel is the antinomian threat. In a 
sermon on Deism, Hogg warns that it is best "always to avoid 
any attempt to explain [Christian] mysteries. The necessity 
and belief of a mystery is one thing, but the explanation is 
another."18 Antinomian doctrine concerns itself with such 
explanations, "splitting the doctrines of Calvin into 
thousands of indistinguishable films" and "making 
distinctions in religion where none existed" (pp. 15,17). As 
Mr. Blanchard warns Robert, "there is not an error into which 
a man can fall which he may not press Scripture into his 
service as a proof of the probity or' (p. 120). Gil-Martin 
persuades Robert to murder Mr. Blanchard by arguing that "if 
saved, he is only exchanging his situation for a better one; 
and if unworthy, it is better that he fall" (p. 122). This 
is the logic of dunking witches--what Douglas Gifford calls 
"the central 'Lie'" of the novel, an untruth "which lies at 
the heart of Christian theology, and allows for the whole 
fabric of 'justified' egotism and social evil to result.1I19 
The old Calvinist rhyme--that you are damned if you do, and 
damned if you don't--is perfectly equivocal: like Gil-
Martin's "two-edged sword," a weapon which can cut either 
way. 
Thus Robert plays Devil's advocate to Gil-Martin more 
literally than he knows, positing his own damnation to be 
reassured of justification. L.L. Lee points out that it is 
Robert, after all, "who dresses in black, becoming the Black 
Man, the traditional figure of the Devil"; in a sense, he 
resembles the Devil more than the Devil resembles himself--or 
as much as he resembles anyone else.20 
The "doubleness" of Robert's instructor reflects the 
duplicity of doctrine: a conception of evil peculiarly 
intellectual, and perhaps (as Hart maintains) distinctively 
Scottish. In the Scotland of Justified Sinner, doctrine is 
double talk--like Macbeth's witches, Gil-Martin parleys "in a 
double sense"--and the lies Robert "frames" as a child are 
early exercises in self-justification (and the "framing" of 
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innocent bystanders). As a boy, Robert is taught to pray 
that the old laird (a man "all over spotted with the leprosy 
of sin") might be "cut off in the full flush of his iniquity, 
and be carried quick into hell"; and that young George "might 
also be taken from a world he disgraced, but that his sins 
might be pardoned, because he knew no better" (pp. 89,19). 
The laird's leprous condition recalls the "lazar-like" body 
of Hamlet's father, "cut off even in the blossoms of [his] 
sin"; the double standard echoes the same ghost's commission 
to young Hamlet, who may damn his adoptive father but must 
leave his mother "to Heaven:t21 Like Hamlet, Robert receives 
a supernatural license to kill; like Hamlet, he is instructed 
in equivocal terms. Like Hamlet, too, he comes to suspect 
that his instructor is not "spirit of health," but a "goblin 
damned." But of course this intelligence comes too late: 
only at the end does Robert object to Gil-Martin's counsels 
as "equivocal, and susceptible of being rendered in a meaning 
perfectly dreadful" (p. 215). Such has been the case all 
along; but Robert has finally recognized that Gil-Martin's 
words--like the weapons he sees "descending out of Heaven"--
are turned against him. 
Gil-Martin can "turn" Scripture to his advantage because 
antinomian reasoning is circular. Similarly, Robert is 
possessed "by turns." Indeed, there are probably more 
"turnings" in Justified Sinner than in The Turn of the Screw--some 
form of the word appears at least sixty eight times in the 
text--and the cumulative effect of these "many turnings" is 
to describe the novel's characteristic motion: that is, 
movement in a circle. Robert complains that his mind is kept 
"in a state of agitation resembling the motion of a 
whirlpool" (p. 108). As his world collapses, he writes: "[I 
was] revolving in my mind what I ought to do to be free ... 
driven to my wits' end, I got up and strode furiously round 
an' round the room" (pp. 186-7). Similarly, the apparition 
of "Welldean Hall" reduces the doctor to "walking round and 
round the library"; the circular movement of Justified Sinner 
also recalls The Three Perils of Women, the pervasively 
circular (and rather inferior) novel Hogg wrote a year or so 
before Justified Sinner--the chapters are even called 
"Circles."22 
Antinomianism is finally a trap, a kind of revolving 
endgame. Robert believes that he slays according to God's 
will, since those he slays are sinners. But the turn of this 
particular screw, of course, is that Robert may be sinning 
according to God's will, precisely because he is predestined 
to be damned. If doctrine is reversible, so is destiny; if 
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predestination is true, there is no end to causality. Robert 
would like to occupy a priviledged position on the periphery 
of the system: he wants to serve God, but without being used; 
he wants to move freely through a kind of spiritual freeze 
frame. Maybe there is no other way to be "free" in such a 
system. But the last person to see him alive witnesses 
Robert's failure to escape from the wheel: 
... when he first came into view, he could almost give 
his oath that he saw two people busily engaged at the 
hayrick going round and round it. (p. 219) 
L.L. Lee concludes that the novel's meaning is summed up 
in that image of two revolving figures. Probably the novel 
doesn't have a meaning which can be summed up in an image. 
But the image is a powerful one. Christ has no part in the 
Christianity of Hogg's Scotland. Robert is never really 
offered a way out of the Calvinist trap: he is condemned to 
run round and round the hayrick, pursued and/or pursuing, 
damned and/or justified. We feel a kind of sympathy for him, 
rather like that we feel for Tony Perkins in Psycho--he too 
is a victim, trapped in his own psychodrama. David 
Eggenschwiler suggests that "Robert does not deserve our 
sympathy ... but that may be exactly the point. The way 
out of that nightmare world of psychosis and hatred may begin 
with a forgiveness that cannot be deserved, that can only be 
given."23 Robert finds kindness--eventually--in the 
generosity of those who shelter him for a time; whether or 
not he finds forgiveness cannot be known, and is probably 
irrelevant to the theology which has produced him. 
The problem of what can be known--like the "central lie" 
of doctrine--is a major concern of the text. Again, the 
scene at the hayrick is suggestive: what first appears to be 
two people running around it proves instead to be the hanged 
body of Robert Wringhim. It would seem difficult to mistake 
the one for the other. Perhaps the witness looked away for a 
moment; perhaps he is lying. The alternative--that he 
reports faithfully what he has seen--raises an 
epistemological question. What can we know, in a world where 
"untruth" includes the potential for demonism and deceit? 
Hogg's characters employ a variety of epistemological 
methods. The old laird, waking from a dream, is temporarily 
confused; but "at length, by tracing out a regular chain of 
events, [he] came to be sensible of his real situation" (p. 
8). Mrs. Logan exercises a similarly straightforward 
reasoning process: "she had hopes of having discovered a 
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clue, which, if she could keep hold of the thread, would lead 
her through darkness to the light of truth" (p. 53). The two 
are empirical detectives: good scientists, seeking to 
isolate the strands of experience which mean. 
Other characters are more intuitive, utilizing a kind of 
holistic folk-wisdom. Thus when Reverend Wringhim (ready for 
a good bout of "hair-splitting") demands to know which "part" 
of his conduct has led his servant John to a derogatory 
conclusion, John counters by changing the rules: "nae 
particular pairt, sir; I draw a' my conclusions frae the 
haill 0' a man's character, an' I'm no that aften far wrang" 
(p. 95). Similarly, Bessie Gillie subverts the court with 
her common sense. Hogg's fiction is filled with such Scots 
characters, who display an intuitive grasp of the truth 
behind appearances. Robin Ruthven, in the Auchturmuchty 
episode, has "rather mae wits than his ain" because the 
fairies have made "a' kinds 0' spirits ... visible to his 
een"--thus he sees past the stranger's disguise and, "with 
the greatest readiness and simplicity," reveals the Devil's 
cloven foot (pp. 180,183). Bell Calvert, too, relies upon 
"impressions," arguing that "we have nothing on earth but our 
senses to depend on; if these deceive us, what are we to do?" 
(p. 73). 
She has anticipated the problem. Appearances deceive, 
and intuition is perhaps the better means for recognizing 
evil--but like reason, intuition is subject to enthusiasm, 
and is as potentially contagious as the religious madness at 
Auchturmuchty. Bell Logan and Bell Calvert's "heated 
imaginations" contain the germ of mob mentality. Thus the 
landlady, entering the room, catches "the infection": 
"It is he!" cried Mrs. Logan, hysterical. 
"Yes, yes, it is he!" cried the landlady, in 
unison. 
"It is who?" said Mrs. Calvert. "Whom do you mean, 
mistress?" 
"Oh, I don't know! I don't know! I was 
affrighted." 
"Hold your peace then till you recover your senses, 
and tell me, if you can, who that young gentleman is who 
keeps company with the new Laird of DalcastIe?" 
"Oh, it is he! It is he!" screamed Mrs. Logan, 
wringing her hands. 
"Oh, it is he! It is he!" cried the landlady, 
wringing hers. (p. 77) 
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Impressionism leads to impressionableness in a manner which 
recalls the "temporary madness" (and mistaken identities) of 
the Black Bull riot: already the women are "wringing" their 
hands in anticipation of what they will do to Wringhim. "The 
thing cannot be," Mrs. Calvert says, backpedalling briefly: 
"it is a phantasy of our disturbed imaginations." But her 
own words return to haunt her: "As you said," Mrs. Logan 
counters, "we have nothing but our senses to depend on ... 
[and] whose word, or whose reasoning can convince us against 
our own senses?" (p. 78). What is "sensible" or "reasonable" 
is no longer clear; and for the rest of the night "their 
conversation was wholly about the dead, who seemed to be 
alive, and their minds were wandering and groping in a chaos 
of mystery" (p. 77). Mrs. Logan has fallen rather 
considerably from her high intention of following "a clue .. 
. through darkness to the light of truth." 
The more rigorously scientific methods fail as welL 
Reverend Wringhim claims to have discovered "eight different 
kinds of faith, all perfectly distinct ... but [Rabina 
Colwan] had discovered other five, making twelve in all" (p. 
13). There is no need to apologize for Hogg's math: the 
point is that Wringhim's sort of "hair-splitting" fails to 
add up; "overstrained" reasoning produces "pairts" unequal to 
the "hailL" Robert himself is "possessed of strong and 
brilliant parts" (p. 190). If impressionism leads to mobs, 
scientific method leads to executions, and to the cold, 
partial logic of Robert's calling. 
Of course, these are examples of methods "mightily 
overstrained, and deformed." But Bell Calvert's concern--"if 
[our senses] deceive us, what are we to do?"--suggests that 
there may be more levels of untruth, or "unknowing," than 
there are means for knowing. At the most rudimentary level 
of perception, we may be unable to see what happens--thus 
Robert complains, "I had a full view of part of what passed, 
though not all" (p. 128). Or we may be unsure what we have 
seen, or unable to understand it. Bell Calvert's account of 
George's murder is filled with such uncertainty, and her 
confusion is echoed syntactically: 
Young Dalcastle either had a decided advantage over 
his adversary, or else the other thought proper to let 
him have it; for he shifted, and wore, and flitted from 
Dalcastle's thrusts like a shadow, uttering ofttimes a 
sarcastic laugh, that seemed to provoke the other. (po 
71, my underlining) 
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The designation of "other" has "shifted" almost imperceptibly 
from Gil-Martin to George--a syntactical turning. 
Or we may be unable even to remember what we know. "I 
think it was said to me," the editor begins at one point; 
elsewhere, Samuel Scrape's advice to Robert involves a 
similar failure: "There is a gouden rule whereby to detect 
[evil], an' that never, never fails. The auld witch didna 
gie me the rule, an' though I hae heard tell o't often an' 
often, shame fa' an I ken what it is" (pp. 50, 184). Perhaps 
the rule is as good as he says--but not if he can't remember 
it. 
Hogg's narrative instructs repeatedly that all 
experience is subjective--that a dozen witness to the same 
event will narrate it a dozen different ways. (Thus, 
"several people happened to mention [him] ... but at the 
same time they all described him differently" p. 117.) This 
is bad enough. It is further complicated by a second, 
conceptive level of untruth, where psychology, deceit, and 
repression come into play. We may lie to others; we may be 
duped by them; we may lie to ourselves. Lee notes, for 
example, that it is apparently "a psychological necessity for 
Robert not to remember that he has stabbed his brother in the 
back," while Bell Calvert admits George's advantage over his 
adversary might not be what it seems.24 A similar 
uncertainty strings Robert along to his damnation. 
But the problem of knowing is infinitely complicated by 
a third level of untruth: the existence of demonism, and a 
"Prince" of lies. All the common sense and folk wisdom and 
intuition in the world are not enough to combat a Devil whose 
"chameleon art" enables him to shift his shape at will. 
Robin Ruthven may have glimpsed his cloven hoof; but the 
Devil seems to have learned from that experience, and when 
Robert examines Gil-Martin's foot he confesses that it is 
"the foot of a gentleman in every respect, so far as 
appearances" go (p. 185). In the end, perhaps only Bessie 
Gillie is cautious enough: when asked to identify items 
resembling those stolen from his mistress, she objects that 
"Like is an ill mark . . . . I wadna swear to my ain 
forefinger, if it had been so lang out 0' my sight an' 
brought in an' laid on that table" (p. 62). 
Perhaps what is most fascinating about Justified Sinner 
is the failure of its multiple narratives to add up to a 
whole. Even the novel's earliest critics noted (and 
complained) that the frame is perversely complex. Robert 
doesn't understand much of his own story. The author himself 
is only a disinterested character, and the created "editor" 
Jeopardy in Justified Sinner 
throws up his hands at the end--"With regard to the work 
itself," he concludes, "I dare not venture a judgment, for I 
do not understand it" (p. 229). He does venture a few 
judgments, of course--but we know better than to consider 
them authoritative. Hogg's interlocking narratives create an 
illusion of authenticity, but very little authority. The 
author's appearance at the end is rather like Robert's 
intrusion at the tennis match, and like that intrusion it 
changes the rules of the game--but Hogg doesn't give us the 
new rules. The narrative itself is a kind of final untruth. 
Some critics claim that, in the end, "only the reader 
can perceive all the facts of the story.,,25 But surely even 
this is overstating the case. Smollett is closer to the 
"truth" when he writes in The Adventures of Ferdinand Count 
Fathom that "the violent passions that agitate the human mind 
... are all false perspectives, which though they magnify, 
yet perplex and render indistinct every object which they 
represent."26 Every perspective in Justified Sinner is as 
problematic as Ambrose Bierce's "Moonlit Road," in which the 
same story is told three times--Bierce's last character 
narrates from beyond the grave, but even her report is 
fragmentary and inconclusive. We are left in the position of 
Hogg's editor at the beginning, with a mass of conflicting 
traditions and testimonies. There is an ironic sense in 
which Robert himself is finally no more than bits and pieces: 
"fragments" of cloth distributed among the curious, "some 
teeth, and part of a pocket-book" (p. 225). 
Michael York Mason suggests in a carefully argued essay 
that "we cannot by any arrangement match the four main kinds 
of evidence: the traditionary tales ... the account of an 
exhumation in Hogg's letter, what the editor finds at the 
gravesite, and the story in the Confessions of a Sinner 
pamphlet."27 Like Kiely, Mason argues that in the end "we 
still do not know if Robert Wringhim killed George Colwan, or 
even whether the corpse the editor exhumes is that of 
Robert"; nor can we be sure, Kiely adds, whether George 
Colwan is dead. Mason proceeds to a fascinating conclusion--
that there are in fact three graves, and we have no way of 
knowing who is buried in any of them. The tradition for each 
is elaborate, and the way "these three versions meet and 
diverge is as puzzling as the question of the separateness or 
identity of Robert Wringhim, Gil-Martin, and George 
Colwan."28 
That "mysterious central trinity" is a puzzle in its own 
right.29 Robert haunts George, then comes to believe he is 
George; Gil-Martin haunts George as Robert, then haunts 
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Robert as George. Michael Kearns points out that the 
descriptions of George's "evil genius" (who always appears at 
his right) and of Robert's "second self" (to his left) place 
Gil-Martin somewhere between the two; he triangulates them.3o 
At Arthur's Seat the configuration changes, or turns: now 
George is at the center, fleeing from one apparition (before 
him) and colliding with the other (behind). Clearly Robert's 
possession is more than mere doubling: there are at least 
two of him, and sometimes three. He believes that he is "two 
people," but writes that "the most perverse part [of that 
belief] is that I rarely conceived myself to be any of the 
two ... I thought for the most part that my companion was 
one of them, and my brother the other" (p. 140). Thus Robert 
moves to the center position. Later he complains that "one-
half, or two-thirds of my time, seemed to me to be totally 
lost" (p. 165). Increasingly, his identity is up for grabs: 
like Reverend Wringhim's calculations, or the story's 
multiple narratives and graves, Robert's "parts" don't quite 
add up to "Robert." He calls Gil-Martin that companion "out 
of whose eye I had now no life"--if we allow the pun, the 
comment is illustrative, since Robert retains very little "I" 
of his own (p. 126). Possession by an Other is a kind of 
dissemination of the self; whether Gil-Martin is double or 
Devil, it is finally Robert's identity which is in jeopardy. 
"I have three of your letters, n Robert's attorney tells him, 
"and three of your signatures"; presumably he means the same 
signature in triplicate, but the comment is suggestive (p. 
162). Robert's fragmentation is a matter of creating 
divisions "where none existed"; perhaps, like the doctrine 
which informs him, he is on the way to "splitting" into a 
thousand "indistinguishable films." 
Robert's multiple possession is a variation on Gil-
Martin's "chameleon art of changing [his] appearance," a 
shape-shifting talent which also characterizes the 
subjectivity of experience and the splitting of antinomian 
hairs. "Should any man ever read this scroll," Robert 
writes, "he will wonder at this confession, and deem it 
savage and strange. So it appeared to me at first, but a 
constant thinking of an event changes everyone of its 
features" (p. 133, my underlining). Theology, like 
experience, depends on how you look at it; the chameleon art 
determines how it looks. Robert discovers something like the 
art as a child, drawing in M'GiU's account book: "I 
conceived that I had hit the very features of Mr. Wilson" (p. 
100). His mother may have the talent, too--Reverend Wringhim 
explains that resemblances like that between Robert and 
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himself "depend much on the thoughts and affections of the 
mother ," going on to share an anecdote about a woman 
"delivered of a blackamoor child" because she was startled by 
a negro servant (p. 97).:n Such an "art" is the nature--or 
the strategy--or evil. 
What is finally most uncanny (and perhaps most 
frightening) about Hogg's Devil is his tendency to 
reduplicate. Otherness leads to other Others: not only can 
Gil-Martin change his face, he can occupy more than one place 
(or face) at a time. How many Gil-Martins are there? Every 
character is suspect: as Gifford notes, "once we are in tune 
with Hogg's idiom here it is easy to appreciate the sinister 
implications of that 'stranger' who told George about 
Robert's presence at the tennis match. Such 'strangers' and 
'someones' are key clues in Hogg's supernatural method . .,32 
Who is the "someone or other," for example, who starts the 
riot that might have killed George Colwan? Or the unnamed 
"young spark" who "imprudently" suggests that George and 
company retire to the brothel where George is later murdered? 
Or the "man" (later an "artful and consummate fiend") who 
joins Bell Calvert just in time to witness the duel? 
Ironically, we are told (two or three times, lest we miss the 
point) that this fellow's special talent is his inability to 
forget a face. Bell herself is suspicious: "my head is 
giddy,1t she complains, "and I feel as if I were surrounded 
with fiends. Who are you, sir?" (p. 69). Her "impression" 
adumbrates Robert's situation at the end. 
Even characters whose names we know may not be what they 
seem: if Gil-Martin can impersonate George or Robert or 
Blanchard or Drummond, surely he might pass for "young 
Kilpatrick"--the name is suggestive--or "Adam Gordon," in 
whom George finds a friend "who entered into all his 
feelings, and had seen and knew everything" (p. 44).33 No 
wonder he can anticipate George's every move: George 
generally tells someone where he's going, and Gil-Martin may 
be that "someone" at any given moment. Justi/ied Sinner 
really can't be read as a detective novel--there would be no 
getting all of the suspects into the drawing room. Gil-
Martin can split hairs--or Robert's psyche--or himself, 
infinitely. Bell Calvert sees George killed by a rapier; 
court testimony gives that it was a "two-edged sword." 
Precisely: Gil-Martin's sword cuts either way, or both ways 
at once. Thus his "low whisper" at the door of the brothel 
is simultaneously a demand "sharp" enough for Bell to 
overhear it, across the street and two floors up. 
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Bell herself may be a devil, or a kind of devil. Her 
first scene with Mrs. Logan is charged with diabolical hints. 
Like Gil-Martin, she has been "invisible; a being to be heard 
of, not seen" (p. 57); like Gil-Martin, she resembles her 
companion more and more. Mrs. Logan may call her "Miss, 
mistress, or widow, as you choose, for I have been all three 
... aye. and something beyond all these" (p. 56, my 
emphasis). The claim recalls that "mysterious central 
trinity." Mrs. Logan asks Bell where she was the night of 
the murder; "Where the Devil would, I was!" Bell replies, 
adding, "Ah, it was a vile action! A night to be remembered 
that was!" She almost seems to be gloating. Later she tells 
Mrs. Logan, "You must accompany me to the other world" (p, 
57). Mrs. Logan at length confesses, "since ever we met, I 
have been so busy thinking about who you might be that I do 
not know what you have been proposing" (p. 58). Gil-Martin 
seduces Robert in much the same way. 
And Bell Calvert resembles Robert. She has a special 
fear of "being hung up," made "a spectacle" of --again, 
prefiguring what happens to Robert in the weaver's house. 
Later, when she sees Robert, she makes an unusual confession: 
"if a demon could inherit flesh and blood, that youth is 
precisely such a being as I could conceive that demon to be" 
(p. 82). The temptation is strong to end the sentence with 
"I could conceive"--even as it reads, the line is pregnant 
with possibilities. Their names, too, are strangely linked: 
"Calvert" is Scots Gaelic for "calf-herd"; before he dies, 
Robert is hired "to herd a stock of young cattie."34 
This is not to say that Bell Calvert is the Devil, but 
rather to show the infinite, "chameleon" suggestiveness of 
the text. Names are telling emblems throughout, beginning 
with the narrator's opening remarks: 
It appears from tradition . ~ . that the lands of 
Dalcastle (or Dalchastel, as it is often spelled) were 
possessed by a family of the name of Col wan ... That 
family was supposed to have been a branch of the ancient 
family of Colquhuon, and it is certain that from it 
spring the Cowans.(p. 3) 
Already we have five variously interchangeable names, and the 
motif of possession. The interest in the naming process is a 
result of Hogg's mixture of theology and folklore. Gil-
Martin's name may also derive from folklore--elsewhere Hogg 
uses "Gil-Moules" and "Gil-Mouly" as folk names for the 
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Devil--and his own naming process is as self-conscious as 
Pip's: 
... If you cannot converse without naming me, you may 
call me Gil for the present . . . and if I think proper 
to take another name at any future period, it shall be 
with your approbation .... Very well, you may call me 
Gil-Martin. It is not my Christian name, but it is a 
name which may serve your turn. (p. 118) 
"Gil-Martin" derives from "McGilmartin," or "'son of devotee' 
Scots Gaelic 'of (Saint) Martin,'" and echoes the name of 
Robert's childhood adversary, M'Gill--from "McGill," or "son 
of Gill" (or Gil).35 Thus Robert's is not the only genealogy 
which is problematic. Robert's mother is "Rab," or "Raby," 
both dimunitives of "Robert"; Thomas Drummond, whose "double" 
slays George Colwan, is named after the apostle--"Thomas, 
called the twin." Names are a magical category, and a matter 
of endless punning: thus "Gil" carries a "gilded" sword, and 
Robert longs to "look his brother in the face at Gilgal" (p. 
137: appropriately, Gilgal = "a circle"). 
The country people are alert to the chameleon quality of 
names. When Robert rather ineptly passes himself off as 
"Cowan," the weaver gives his wife "a look that spoke a 
knowledge of something alarming or mysterious: 
"Hal Cowan?" said he. "That's most extraordinairl 
Not Colwan, I hope?" (p. 192) 
Like Robin Ruthven, he has seen through the disguise. As 
Gifford notes, "truth presents itself in such a form that the 
burden of interpretation rests with the beholder, who makes 
as it were a moral choice in the selection of his version."36 
Thus the people of Auchtumuchty misjudge the Devil to be "an 
angel" in disguise, and Robert believes that Gil-Martin is 
the Czar of Russia (p. 181). 
Whether he hides behind a name, a face, or an argument, 
the Devil is always in disguise; evil is "the more 
frightening because it is ambiguous," and we "can never be 
sure of its form."37 Thus epistemology is inextricably bound 
with the problem of evil: how can we know anything when the 
universe lies to us? A character in "Welldean Hall" 
elaborates on a familiar position: 
A man has nothing but his external senses to depend 
on in this world. If these may be supposed to be 
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fallacious, what is to be considered as real that we 
either hear or see? I conceive, that if a man believes 
that he does see an object standing before him, and 
knows all its features and lineaments, why, he does see 
it, let casuists say what they will. If he hear it 
pronounce words audibly, who dare challenge the senses 
that God has given him, and maintain that he heard no 
such word pronounced? I would account the man a 
presumptuous fool who would say so ... knowing in 
whose hand the universe is balanced.S8 
Knowing in whose hand the universe is balanced is 
precisely the problem; in Justified Sinner, the hand is Gil-
Martin's. Todorov has suggested that "supernatural beings 
compensate for a deficient causality."s9 A deficiency is in 
evidence: the old laird dies waiting for "Heaven [to] bring 
to light the truth concerning the untimely death of his son"; 
Bell Calvert calls upon God to "subvert the order of nature" 
(pp. 52, 83). Some such subversion surely occurs. But the 
causality behind it is demonic. "How grand is the 
conviction," Gilbert continues in "Welldean Hall," that 
"there is a Being on your right hand and your left, that sees 
the actions of all his creatures" (my emphasis).4o Robert 
comes to share the conviction, but not its grandeur. Even 
the "justice" which Arabella Logan and Calvert accomplish is 
a result of Gil-Martin's manipulations. He incriminates 
Robert so broadly that the women begin to have "some hopes 
that this extraordinary being was on a mission of the same 
sort as themselves"; even Robert realizes that his companion 
intends to deal the last hand against him (p. 80). 
Similarly, the Devil sets up Bell Calvert to witness George's 
murder, winking at her all the while. But has she been set 
up to see Drummond murder George, or to see Drummond leaving 
before the murder--i.e., as a witness for or against him? 
Near the end, Robert notes his companion's mounting despair 
and believes Gil-Martin will perish with him. But we have no 
reason to believe it: Gil-Martin is only maneuvering Robert 
to the point of his own self-destruction. 
Subversion and manipulation will not be contained by the 
"frame" of the story. It is finally not enough to say that 
any character's version of whatever it is that happens in 
Justified Sinner is unreliable: the text itself is 
"characterized" by a general distrust of literary creation 
itself. Robert's blundering into the loom is emblematic--in 
one way or another, everyone is entangled in the creative 
process. The author is a character in his own book. The 
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editor, too, becomes a shady participant (and remains 
damnably jocular about the whole affair). And Robert takes 
an unexpected interest in publishing, printing his 
Confessions before he has finished writing them. The story 
is obsessed with its own fictionality. What if we're all 
wrong, and the "editor" is right? That is, suppose Robert 
Wringhim was writing a religious parable, and believed none 
of his story? Why should the corpse in any of the three 
graves be his? Who wrote the Confessions? Hogg, of COurse--
but are we to pretend Wringhim is the "author," or did the 
(fictional) "Hogg" plant the manuscript when he dug up the 
suicide's grave the first time? As the editor warns, "Hogg 
has imposed as ingenious lies on the public ere now" (p. 
222). 
"One has the impression," writes Kiely, "upon completing 
the book, of having witnessed and imaginatively participated 
in an event, though by no means of having 'grasped' it."41 
The more we try to grasp, the more we are reduced to 
splitting hairs--like M'GiIl, finally unable to account for 
what he finds in his "account book" (p. 100). He has been 
framed. So has the story, one way or another; but every 
effort to "account" for it involves opening another grave. 
There's a ghoulishness to the whole affair. Robert can't 
seem to stay buried: his book comes from the grave, and his 
own remains are dug up several times and redistributed. One 
of the ghouls theorizes at the end that the book (like the 
corpse) has been preserved by God, and may "reveal some 
mystery that mankind disna ken naething about yet" (p. 228). 
But God only knows. Linton has spied the Devil in the 
printing press; his cloven foot could be anywhere. 
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Relaps(e)-comprising almost half of volume seven. If 
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cured. Itistothisend thatthe Friends has been launched. 
Donations or requests for further details should be sent 
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deen University Press, Farmers Hall, Aberdeen, Scot-
land, AB9 2XT. 
185 
